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Introduction
Since the 2007 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in Bali, there has been heightened international 
interest in policy approaches and incentives for REDD. 
Broadly, such schemes involve the provision of funds to 
developing countries to reduce emissions from de-
forestation and degradation, below those that occurred 
during a certain reference period.
Such policies have generated much support, but also 
raised concerns about the potential of curtailed access 
to forest resources negatively impacting on the rights 
and livelihoods of indigenous and rural people (Griffiths, 
2007). Promoting the participation of indigenous and 
local communities in a REDD mechanism, for instance 
through payments for forest conservation, reforestation 
and afforestation, is one option that has been discussed 
to address such concerns. 
Although livelihoods have never been the primary 
focus of PES schemes, recent research has highlighted 
that PES schemes raise a number of risks and 
opportunities for the livelihoods of both participants and 
non-participants (e.g. Grieg-Gran et al, 2005; Pagiola et 
al, 2005; Porras et al, 2008; Wunder, 2008). However, 
evidence is limited given the relatively recent 
implementation of most PES schemes. A comparative 
case study approach has been used here to examine 
eight case studies of PES schemes in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America, to contribute to filling this knowledge 
gap. The research addresses the following questions: 
What have been the livelihood impacts of existing PES 
schemes? What are the implications for the design of 
REDD activities? 
PES & livelihoods: what do we know? 
A PES system has been defined as a voluntary transaction, where a well-defined environmental 
service(s) is bought by a minimum of one buyer from a 
minimum of one seller, if and only if the seller secures 
the provision of the service (Wunder, 2005). Although 
this research draws on this definition as a way of 
conceptualising PES, we recognise that these criteria 
rarely apply in practice (Vatn, 2008); most PES schemes 
range across the spectrum from market-based to 
regulatory approaches. The definition also underplays 
the role of intermediary organisations, which in the 
cases considered here, have helped to establish markets 
for environmental services and facilitate subsequent 
market transactions. 
Although PES schemes were not developed as a 
means of improving livelihoods, there has been 
increasing interest in their impacts on participants and 
non-participants, particularly with respect to poverty 
(Grieg-Gran et al, 2005; Pagiola et al, 2005; Porras et al, 
2008). Whilst the empirical evidence is limited (Engel et 
al, 2008), it shows that: 
• The poor have been able to participate in PES schemes 
even when they are not directly targeted (Wunder et 
al, 2008), but high transaction costs are a significant 
threat to participation (Grieg-Gran et al, 2005; Pagiola 
et al, 2008). The participation of the poor usually 
depends on the nature and location of the 
environmental service, which cannot be fully 
controlled for in the design of PES schemes, since the 
primary objective is to secure the provision of an 
environmental service. Also, their participation in PES 
schemes is often limited by insecure land tenure, small 
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provision of a range of land use change options to suit 
varying household budgets, labour availability and 
technical capacity facilitated the participation of poorer 
households in some cases. Reducing transaction costs is a 
key factor for engagement by poor households in PES. 
Intermediaries often facilitated market access and 
helped participants negotiate contracts, although these 
activities were generally funded with a share of PES 
revenue, which reduced individual or group income from 
PES. The use of collective contracts (e.g. with indigenous 
land-holding bodies or local councils) avoided the much 
higher cost of negotiating individual contracts with 
many smallholders. 
Financial capital
Some of the PES schemes involved contracts and payments for individual households (Mozambique, 
Nicaragua/Colombia, Uganda), others involved contracts 
with and payments to community organisations or 
village councils (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, the 
Philippines), from which a household dividend may have 
been paid. Where household payments were made, they 
were typically a minor component of total household 
income, but were nevertheless important, as the lump 
sum nature of payments enabled bulky outlays e.g. 
investments land or home improvements, payment of 
debts, access to medical services. 
Income from PES often compared poorly with the 
transaction costs of participating, and the opportunity 
costs faced (e.g. foregone income or food production). 
This loss in income could be offset by selecting species 
(e.g. fruit trees in Indonesia) which generated income 
without diminishing the environmental service. 
Where payments were made to groups, the revenue 
was used for investments in community infrastructure 
and services, and in one case paid the salaries of forest 
guards. In some schemes the existence of indigenous 
institutions was important in providing the trust and 
coordination needed for such investments. 
In some cases, PES schemes were reported to have 
stimulated the local economy, e.g. infrastructure 
investments or the development of micro-enterprises. In 
other cases, the increase in local disposable income 
stimulated the growth of local businesses.
Human capital
Capacity building was a key impact of all PES schemes reviewed, covering such areas as environmental 
awareness, land management, agroforestry, silviculture, 
governance of local institutions, business development 
and the understanding of PES. Explicit support, from 
government, donors or 
intermediary organizations was a 
prerequisite for capacity building 
activities. However, there was little 
evidence regarding the long term 
impact of capacity building 
activities, for instance whether new 
knowledge and skills were applied 
in practice. Continuing confusion 
amongst farmers about the details 
of their PES contracts suggests that 
capacity building could have been 
stronger in some cases. 
land holdings and lack of credit (Pagiola et al, 2005).
• Some PES schemes appear to have generated small 
gains above the opportunity costs faced by 
participants (Wunder et al, 2008), which normally 
involve increased income.
• Participants’ non-income benefits may include 
increased tenure security (Grieg-Gran et al, 2005; 
Asquith et al, 2008; Engel and Palmer, 2008) and 
improved social capital (Grieg-Gran et al, 2005). 
Indirect negative impacts may also occur, such as 
reduced quality of roads (due to increased transport of 
produce) and water (due to establishment of timber 
plantations) (Grieg-Gran et al, 2005).
• Limited knowledge exists about impacts on non-
participants who could benefit (e.g. from improved 
water quality from watershed schemes (Wunder, 
2008)), or be negatively affected (e.g. by lower labour 
demand and higher food prices possibly brought about 
by PES schemes (Grieg-Gran et al, 2005)). 
• The amount paid for environmental service provision 
should be based on the value and amount of the 
service provided and thus cannot be designed to 
directly benefit the poor. Efforts to maximize the 
efficiency of PES schemes (environmental benefits 
generated per dollar spent) would minimize payments 
to participants, thus reducing the welfare impacts of 
the scheme (Wunder et al, 2008). 
Case studies
The project originally aimed to select case studies from the top 20 deforesting countries because they 
account for about 80% of global deforestation and are 
spread across Africa, Asia and Latin America. However, it 
was necessary to select several cases outside these 
countries, which were chosen to be as representative  of 
the social and economic conditions of the top 20 
deforesting nations as possible (see Table 1 for the cases 
chosen). A Livelihoods Analysis Approach was used in 
preparing the case studies to facilitate comparability 
between them (see Table 2). 
Findings
Access to PES schemes
The participation of poor households was possible in many of the PES schemes, though in some cases it 
was limited by tenure, labour and capital requirements. 
Property rights figured strongly in access to schemes, 
through prerequisites of secure tenure or minimum farm 
sizes in some schemes. In others, sites were chosen 
because all farmers had secure property rights. The 
Country Title of PES Project
Brazil* Proambiente
Zimbabwe# Communal Area Management Programme For Indigenous Resources
Mexico* Carbon Forestry Payments Programme
Uganda Trees for Global Benefits Programme
Global Global Environment Facility portfolio review
Mozambique Nhambita Carbon Community Project
Indonesia* Cidinau watershed PES scheme
Nicaragua  & Colombia Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project
Philippines* 'No fire bonus' scheme in the Cordillera Region of northern Luzon
* Country ranked amongst the top 20 deforesting countries by FAO (2006).
 #This case study has not been finalised and is not considered in the present analysis.
Table 1. Case studies
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Capital type Key questions
Financial Does the PES scheme increase the overall income of participating households? 
Is a diversity of income sources for participants sustained?
Are there impacts on the income of non-participants? 
Does the PES scheme contribute to increases in the cost of living?
Human Does the PES scheme improve capacity, skills and knowledge, and for whom? 
Does the PES scheme impact on health? 
Is PES income (especially at the community level) invested in education and health improvements?
Natural Does the PES scheme contribute to a change in access to resources? 
Does the PES scheme results in a change of the perceived status/value of natural resources?
Social/political Does the PES scheme impact on the social capital within the community? 
Does the PES scheme impact on coordination and influence with wider institutions and decision-making processes?
Physical Does the PES scheme impact on investment in local infrastructure?
Table 2. The livelihood analysis framework used for the case studies
Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least one PES 
scheme played a part in strengthening health and school 
services, though these impacts could not be attributed 
solely to the project. 
Natural capital
There was little evidence of changes in access to natural assets, except in Uganda, where smallholder 
afforestation reduced access to fallow land that had 
previously been used informally by poorer households. 
Most studies noted improvements in the status of 
natural resources, though the scale of impact was 
typically small and its relationship to PES scheme 
activities was not always clear. The attribution problem 
arises because monitoring activities typically focused on 
proxies for the environmental services being targeted 
(e.g. land use, fire incidence), which was usually only one 
of a range of factors influencing environmental service 
provision. The localised scale at which monitoring took 
place often made it difficult to assess whether leakage 
was occurring, a point noted as particularly relevant in 
the Brazilian case. 
Social capital
Where schemes worked closely with community institutions, their resource management and social 
coordination capacities were frequently strengthened. 
Where projects worked with individual smallholders, they 
fostered social cohesion amongst participants.
The expansion of networks beyond the community – 
‘bridging capital’ – was facilitated in a number of cases. 
This often led to more effective linkages between 
participating communities and local government, 
stronger local participation in planning processes, 
greater negotiating capacity or political voice amongst 
participating groups. Impacts on internal and external 
networks were emphasised in cases that worked with 
existing community-level institutions. 
Some negative impacts emerged, including conflicts 
between participants and non-participants. The potential 
was also noted for changes in gender roles and labour 
patterns to contribute to intra-household conflict.
Physical capital
Where PES income was paid to community-level institutions, there was evidence of investment in 
community infrastructure, e.g. improvements in water 
supply, roads, clinics and schools. Some case studies 
noted that the wider economic growth due to PES and 
related development initiatives also led to improvements 
in health facilities, schools and other infrastructure.
Implications for the design of REDD activities
Secure property rights is often a condition of access to PES schemes. In many developing countries, forests 
are owned by the state (White and Martin, 2002), thus 
limiting the potential application of PES as a vehicle to 
channel benefits from REDD to communities living in 
and around forest areas. Land tenure reform could be a 
way of addressing this issue, but it is politically charged, 
costly, and can only be implemented over a relatively 
long time. To implement REDD, legislation to transfer 
property rights over the carbon in state forests to local 
communities would be the best alternative to land 
reform, without precluding the latter. However, in the 
Philippines case, communities were involved in a PES-
like scheme even without rights over the forest carbon: 
local government received payments for avoided fires, 
and those payments were invested in improved services 
and infrastructure. Whilst there were problems with that 
scheme, it shows that REDD activities could include a 
PES mechanism even without changes to rights over 
forest carbon.
The design of PES schemes has emphasised the role 
of individual landholders. However, REDD activities will 
need to focus on developing agreements with 
communities unless forest areas are owned by 
individuals. The viability of PES schemes focused on 
common property resources is demonstrated in the 
Mexican case. The involvement of communities in REDD 
implementation could have several benefits. First, it is 
likely to reduce transaction costs (which have been 
found to be a major barrier to the participation of the 
poorest in PES activities). Second, building on local 
community institutions (and if necessary supporting new 
ones) could strengthen social capital, increasing the 
resilience of the community. Third, supporting 
community infrastructure and services would establish 
longer lasting foundations for the improvement of local 
livelihoods than simply providing household income that 
in some cases is rapidly dissipated. Such an approach to 
the design of PES schemes has been shown to increase 
their social benefits, e.g. in the review of the PES 
programs of the Global  Environment Facility. This does 
not imply that income should not be provided; but that 
a combination of the two types of benefit should be 
considered, and their share of the total will need to be 
discussed with the communities. 
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Endnotes
i. This does not imply that the design of the PES scheme considered in the 
Mexico case study is perfect. It should also be noted that when forests are 
owned by the state, the development of a common property ownership system 
would involve transferring at the least rights over carbon to the community. 
ii. See Tacconi and Bennett (1995) for an example of a payment stream 
designed over the life of the conservation activity. 
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In relation to the level of benefits provided by a PES 
scheme, several cases studies (Mexico, Uganda, the 
Philippines) show there is often a failure to clearly assess 
the opportunity costs faced by participants. Failure to at 
least match these opportunity costs would result in 
negative impacts on livelihoods. It is therefore 
imperative that REDD activities measure these 
opportunity costs and seek to provide benefits in excess 
of these costs. To participate, transaction costs must also 
be faced (e.g. time input to meetings, etc.), thus benefits 
must be sufficient to offset those costs as well. 
The timing of the distribution of benefits is another 
aspect that will need to be addressed. Financial benefits 
have often been fully disbursed during the first decade 
of a PES scheme (e.g. Mozambique), but participants 
sometimes do not fully understand the terms of the 
contract and think that at the end of the payments, the 
contract will be renewed. This misunderstanding could 
generate significant problems for the viability of REDD 
schemes, which would normally be expected to last at 
least several decades. Ideally, the benefit stream should 
be designed to last for the duration of the REDD activity. 
If providing a stream of benefits over the lifetime of the 
REDD activity were impossible, then all efforts should be 
made to ensure that this aspect of the contract is well 
understood by the participants.
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